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The Prospects for Public
Aid to Parochial Schools
Paul G. Haskell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Elementary and secondary education in America is predominantly public, but some diversity is provided by church-related

private schools and, to a lesser degree, by secular private schools.
Most of the church schools are maintained by the Roman Catholic Church and its orders. Church schools are usually chosen by
parents because of their desire to have their children's instruction related to their religion and to the philosophical positions of
their church. In some instances, however, the schools are chosen
because it is believed that they are academically superior to the
available public school without regard to the special curricular
concerns of the church schools.1 The secular private school is
usually selected because it is considered to be academically su-

perior or methodologically distinctive, although in the cases of
some schools social status is a motivating factor.

The educational diversity afforded by the private elementary
and secondary schools does not, of course, compare with the diversity in higher education afforded by the wide range of private
colleges and universities as well as the variety of state-supported
colleges and universities. Unlike college age people, young children usually live at home which further limits their educational
choice. Clearly the range of options for elementary and secondary education, in both absolute and comparative terms, is very
limited. It would seem to be in the national interest to preserve
the limited options which presently exist. This is not only because cultural diversity is desirable in itself, but also competition
among schools for enrollment and recognition is likely to serve
as an incentive to achieve academic quality. There is, in addition, the dollars and cents consideration that private schools perform educational services at little cost to the taxpayers.
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. In a recent poll Catholics were asked, "For what reasons, aside
from religion, do you think Catholics send children to parochial schools?"
Responses were: "for better education"-33%; "for discipline"-30%;
"for racial reasons'--7%. They were also asked, "If no government
funds were allowed for parochial schools, would you be willing to spend
more to keep them going?" "Yes"-49%; "No"-38%. NEWsvEEK,
Oct. 4, 1971, at 83.
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The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 concerning Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
legislation which was supportive of church schools makes it more
difficult to maintain educational diversity at the elementary and
secondary level. It is dangerous to generalize too broadly from
this decision, but it is clear that it is unconstitutional to pay the
salaries of parochial school teachers from public funds. Teachers' salaries are the major expense in the administration of
the schools. The Court has held in the past that the state may
constitutionally reimburse parents of church school children for
bus fare to and from school,3 and may furnish secular books to
church school children, 4 but these are minor educational expenses. The recent Supreme Court decision does not affect the
constitutionality of the payment of state funds for teachers'
salaries in secular private schools, but for political reasons it
would appear most unlikely that state legislatures would appropriate funds for secular private schools which could not be
appropriated for church schools. Presumably the established secular private schools attended primarily by the children of
wealthy parents will be able to raise the necessary funds from
private sources, but the more recently created innovative institutions may have great difficulty doing that. The impact of the
Lemon decision upon educational diversity therefore extends beyond the church school.
There are many who view the church school as socially divisive and intellectually undesirable, and there are many who
view the secular private school as undemocratic. Obviously such
people are not impressed with the hardship which the Supreme
Court decision may impose upon such schools or with the danger
to their quality or viability. There are those who believe that
private schools enrich our educational system but believe that it
is wrong in principle that they should receive public funds to
achieve their special educational objectives. If insufficient funds
are available to maintain some of these private schools, then a
judgment has to be made as to whether the preservation of the
principle is worth the loss of the educational value. The writer's
bias is that the principle is not worth the loss, and that the loss of
any portion of the limited diversity that presently exists would
be most unfortunate. There is also the consideration that if
church schools are required to close for lack of funds, their stu2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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dents will attend the public schools, thereby adding to the expense of the public school systems which are already hardpressed to maintain standards with their present enrollment.
The Lemon decision should be analyzed and assessed in the light
of its potential educational consequences. 5
The function of this article is to describe the holdings of thc
several decisions involving the use of public funds in support of
church schools, to analyze critically the reasoning of these decisions, and to consider whether there are constitutionally permissible alternatives for public funding of elementary and secondary church schools.0
I.

THE PUBLIC AID CASES

Everson v. Board of Education7 was the first case in which
5.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 18, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 3,

reported that in 1964 there were six million students in 14,600 Catholic

elementary and secondary schools, whereas in June, 1971 there were

11,352 Catholic elementary and secondary schools with an enrollment
of 4.5 million students. Since June, 1971, it is estimated that 800
Catholic schools have closed.

The decline in the number of Catholic

schools is attributed to financial pressures. The National Catholic Educational Association predicts that about one-half the present Catholic
school enrollment will be in public schools by 1975 unless more government aid is made available. NEwswnEK, Oct. 4, 1971, at 83.
6. There has been considerable writing on the subject of public
aid to church schools in the past decade. E.g., W. KATz, REuGON AND
AavmlcAN CoxsTrrONs (1964); P. KAuPER, RELIGION AND THm CONSTITUTION (1964); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE
AN
SurPREm COURT (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
(1967); THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Areen,
Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools: A Breach in the Sacred Wall?, 22 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 230 (1971); Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
ParochialSchools, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 260 (1968); Drinan, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 75 CASE AND COM., No. 2, Mar.-April 1970 at 13; Duval,
The Constitutionality of State Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1970 U. Iu,. L. FORUM 342; Ellington, The Principle of
Nondivisiveness and the Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 5 GA. L. REV. 429 (1971); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680 (1969); Gellhorn & Greenawalt, Public
Support and the Sectarian University, 38 FoRDnAM L. REV. 395 (1970);

Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-

ment Part UI, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513
(1968); Kurland, Politics and the Constitution: Federal Aid to Parochial
Schools, 1 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 475 (1966); La Noue, The Child

Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportatin and Medical Care,

13 J. PUB. L. 76 (1964); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968); Valente, Aid to Church

Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. Rv. 579
(1969); Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial Schools-A
Reply to Professor Freund, 59 GEO. L.J. 59 (1970).
7. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the United States Supreme Court dealt directly with the constitutionality of the use of state funds in support of church
schools under the "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment.8 A New Jersey statute authorized local boards of
education to provide for the transportation of children to and
from schools other than private schools operated for profit. Pursuant to the statute, a local board of education authorized the
reimbursement of parents for fares paid for the transportation
to and from school of children attending Roman Catholic schools
as well as public schools. 10 The statute and the board action
were challenged by a taxpayer as a violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment." The New Jersey court
upheld the statute and the board action. 1 2 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision.
The Supreme Court employed some rather restrictive language in arriving at its permissive result:
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support

any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion ....
* * * New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of
religion" clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised
funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets
13
and faith of any church ....
The Court nevertheless concluded that:
Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First
Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised
funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part
of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils
attending public and other schools .... 14
8. In Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1930),
the Supreme Court held the furnishing of secular textbooks to private
school students, including students in church schools, was not violative
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a use of tax
funds for a private purpose. The question of the constitutionality of the
legislation under the establishment clause of the First Amendment was
not considered since at that time it had not been decided that the clause
was binding upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. N. J. REv. STAT. § 39-1 (1968).

10.

In Everson, the Court noted that there was nothing in the record

to indicate that there were any children in the township who attended
other than public or Catholic schools or who would have attended other
than public or Catholic schools if transportation had been provided. 330
U.S. at 4 n.2.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Everson v. Board of Ed., 133 N.J.L. (Ct. of Errors & App.) 350,
44 A.2d 333 (1945).
13. Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
14. Id. at 17.
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The Court likened the provision of transportation to the furnishing of the services of the police and fire departments, connections for sewage disposal, and highways and sidewalks to
the parochial schools. The payment of bus fares was characterized as a safety measure and in no sense a subsidization with
public funds of religious instruction. The Court also noted that
the state funds were paid directly to the parents and not to the
parochial schools. The Court recognized that furnishing bus
fare to parochial school students made it easier for parents to
send them to those schools, but pointed out that the same could
be said for the variety of other public services furnished to these
schools, which unquestionably were constitutionally permissible.
The characterization of the bus fare reimbursement as a
safety measure raised the hypothetical issue of whether the "freedom of religion" clause of the First Amendment required that
parochial school parents be reimbursed if public school parents
were reimbursed. The Court stated that it did not mean to intimate that such equality of treatment would be required.5 The
Court, however, emphasized that the establishment clause did
not require the state to be an adversary of religion by denying it
such safety services.1
Twenty-one years after Everson the Court dealt with state
financial assistance to church schools in the form of furnishing
15. Id. at 16. In Hughes v. Board of Ed., 174 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971), the supreme court of West Virginia held the refusal by a school board to furnish bus transportation
to parochial school students when it is furnished to public school students to be unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection and an infringement of the freedom of religion. See also R. DRi.NAN, RELImoN,
s CoURTs AND PuBrc PoLicy 188-201 (1963).

16. Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Many state constitutions have explicit provisions prohibiting the use of public funds for
the support of sectarian educational institutions. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art.

IX, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3; HAwAn CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13; MAss. CONST. art. XLVI, § 2; MnN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MoNT. CONST. art. XI, § 8; N.H. CONST. part II, art.
83; Oi.r CoNsT. art. II, § 5; PA. CONST. art. III, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. XI,
§ 9; VA. CONST. art. X, § 141; WAsH. CONST. art. IX, § 4. Some state courts

have held that bus transportation for parochial school students is violative of their respective state constitutions. E.g., Matthews v. Quinton,
362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Spears v.
Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1968); Board of Ed. v. Antone, 384 P.2d
911 (Okla. 1963); Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761
(1962). However, some state courts have held that it is not violative of
the state constitution. E.g., Americans United, Inc. v. Independent
School Dist., 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970), appeal dismissed, 403
U.S. 945 (1971); Honohan v. Holt, 17 Ohio Misc. 57, 244 N.E.2d 537 (1968);
Rhoades v. Abington, 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
11 (1967).
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secular textbooks. In Board of Education v. Allen, 17 certain
school boards in the State of New York brought an action challenging the constitutionality under the establishment clause of
the First Amendment of a provision of New York's Education
Law which required local school boards to lend textbooks free of
charge to all public and private school students in grades seven
through 12, including students in church schools. 18 The law was
construed by the New York Court of Appeals to require that only
secular textbooks be furnished to church school students, although the language of the statute was not absolutely clear on
this point. The New York court went on to hold that the statute was not violative of the First Amendment,'0 and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, Justices Black, Douglas and Fortas dissenting.
The Supreme Court employed the standard expressed in Abington School District v. Schempp 20 which involved the constitutionality of religious ceremonies in the public schools, that "to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."'2' The Court stated that just as
the establishment clause did not prevent New Jersey from paying the bus fares of parochial school pupils as part of a general
program of paying fares of school students, it did not prevent
New York from making secular textbooks available to parochial
school students as part of a general program of furnishing textbooks to school students. As in Everson, the legislative purpose
was secular and its primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited
religion. The legislation literally provided that the books were to
be lent to the student at his request and ownership remained in
the state. The Court pointed out that no funds or books were to
be furnished to the parochial schools, but rather the financial benefit of the program was to the parents and the children.
In actual operation, it appeared that the parochial schools furnished to the school boards summaries of the student requests,
and the books acquired were stored on the premises of the parochial schools.
The appellant school boards attempted to distinguish Everson from this case by contending that buses have nothing to do
17. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. N.Y. ED. LAW § 701 (Supp. 1967).
19. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1967).
20. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
21. Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
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with teaching but books do, and that the function of the church
school is to weave religion into the teaching of what are normally secular subjects. The Court responded by noting the dual
secular and religious functions of the church schools and the
state requirements that they comply with secular educational
standards. The Court also pointed out that the case was decided
by summary judgment entered on the pleadings, and that there
was nothing in the record to support the contention that the
secular books would be used to teach religion or that secular and
religious instruction were intertwined in the parochial schools. 2
It should be noted that the Court in Allen, as in Everson,
made a point of the fact that the benefit of the legislation ran
to the pupils and not to the parochial school as such. Why any
constitutional consequence should follow from such a distinction
is less than clear. It should also be noted that the Court in Allen
made no reference to the problems of policing the secular nature of the textbooks furnished by the school boards and the
"church-state entanglement" issue which might flow from it; this
issue was to become most significant in the subsequent Lemon
case.23 Also, no mention was made in Allen of the danger of political pressures from religious groups upon local school boards,
which was to become a major consideration in the Lemon case.
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Allen stressed these matters.
22. Id. at 248. See also Protestants and Other Americans United

v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd and remanded,
435 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971), where an action was brought to enjoin enforcement of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 821-27 (1965), which authorized federal grants
for library and instructional materials for use in public and private
schools, including parochial schools. The trial court declined to convene
a three-judge court and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. The Sixth Circuit ordered a three-judge court be convened
noting that the Allen case was not necessarily controlling since under the
statute the materials went directly to the schools. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Recently a three-judge court was convened to consider the constitutionality of a New York statute providing for state subsidization of testing and pupil record services for parochial schools.
Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322 F.
Supp. 678 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
The Oregon supreme court has held the furnishing of secular books
to parochial schools students violative of its state constitution. Dickman
v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961). However, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court has held that the furnishing of secular books,
testing services, and medical services to parochial schools is not violative
of the state constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258 A.2d
343 (1969). The Rhode Island supreme court has held that furnishing
textbooks to parochial schools does not violate provisions of the state or
federal constitution. Bowerman v. O'Connor, 247 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1968).
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Two years later the Supreme Court decided in Walz v. Tax
Commission24 that the exemption from the property tax granted
to church property used for worship was not violative of the
establishment clause. This case has a direct bearing upon the
issue of state aid to church schools because it involves a type of
financial subsidy of religion, and much of the reasoning employed in the Court's opinion is related to the previous Everson
and Allen cases and the subsequent Lemon case and Tilton v.
Richardson.25 The Court stated its guiding principle to be
that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of
those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious 26exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference.
The Court noted that the "aids" furnished religion in Everson and Allen were consistent with this neutrality as programs
of financial assistance to education of general applicability.
Similarly, the State of New York determined that certain
types of institutions that foster moral and mental improvement
should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation.
Such institutions include nonprofit hospitals, libraries, schools
and houses of religious worship, among others. Churches were
not singled out for special tax treatment; rather they were considered to come within the classification of organizations entitled
to tax exemption because they shared certain charitable characteristics.
The Court went on to state that "[d]etermining that the
legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing,
sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry,
however. We must also be sure that the end result-the effect27
is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.
The Court pointed out that both taxation and exemption from
taxation involve some degree of entanglement, but taxation
would involve a greater degree of entanglement because of the
problems of valuation, liens, foreclosures and the accompanying
confrontations of state and church arising from the legal processes. Although exemption is a type of economic benefit, it produces minimal involvement or entanglement and tends to separate the church and the state and insulate each from the other.
24.

397 U.S. 664 (1970).

25. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
26. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
27. Id. at 674.
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The Court concluded by pointing out that exemption of

churches from various forms of taxation for two centuries indicated that the establishment clause was never intended to prohibit such exemption. The Court also noted that two centuries
of exemption has not produced anything remotely resembling an

establishment, but rather has operated to guarantee the free exercise of all religions.
Recently the Supreme Court decided cases involving state
aid to church schools in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.2 8 In
1969 Rhode Island enacted legislation providing a 15% supplement to the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic
elementary schools. 2 9 The supplement was paid directly to the
teacher. As supplemented, the salary could not exceed the maximum paid to teachers in the public schools. It was required that
the recipient be certified in the same manner as public school
teachers and teach in a nonpublic school at which the average
per pupil expenditure on secular education was less than the
average in the public schools. The legislation also required that
the teacher must teach only those subjects that are offered in the
public schools, use only teaching materials used in the public
schools, and agree that he will not teach a course in religion
while he is receiving the salary supplement. The schools also
were required to submit financial information in connection with
some of the above requirements.
In 1968 Pennsylvania enacted legislation which authorized
the "purchase" of certain "secular educational services" from
nonpublic schools. 30 The state would reimburse nonpublic
schools directly for their actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials in connection with
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 16-51 (Supp. 1970).
30. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969). In Schade v. Allegheny
County Institution Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956), the prohibition in the Pennsylvania constitution of appropriations to sectarian institutions was held not to preclude the state from paying a sectarian
children's home for keeping certain neglected juveniles subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. In effect, the state was contracting for the purchase of needed services. This is why the Pennsylvania legislation in issue in Lemon was phrased in terms of purchase of secular educational
services, instead of a grant of funds. In fact, funds were appropriated to
be paid to sectarian schools. The rather contrived formulation was for
the purpose of avoiding the state constitutional issue. The federal district court in the Lemon case observed that the "purchase" formulation
had no bearing upon its decision upholding the constitutionality of the
statute under the first Amendment. 310 F. Supp. 35, 39 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
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courses offered in the public schools in mathematics, modem
foreign languages, physical science and physical education.
Textbooks and instructional materials were required to be approved by the state educational authority. Any school seeking
reimbursement was required to maintain prescribed accounting
procedures identifying the separate costs of the secular educational service for which reimbursement was requested, which
accounts were subject to state audit.
The Rhode Island actions were brought in federal district
court by taxpayers to declare the legislation unconstitutional
and to enjoin its operation on the ground that it violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
A three-judge court decided that the legislation violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 31 The Pennsylvania
action was brought in federal district court by taxpayers, among
others, challenging the constitutionality of the legislation under
the First Amendment. The three-judge court granted Pennsylvania's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim for relief, holding that the legislation violated neither the
establishment nor the free exercise clause.82 The United States
Supreme Court, in a consolidated opinion, affirmed the judgments in the Rhode Island cases, Justice White dissenting, and
reversed the judgment and remanded the Pennsylvania case
without dissent.
The Court stated the criteria for determining whether the
state aid to the church schools in these cases violated the establishment clause. The statute must have a secular purpose, and
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion (required by Allen); and the statute must
not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion (required by Walz). The Court concluded that the legislative purpose in each case was secular. As to the effect of the
state aid, the Court noted that while elementary and secondary
church schools have a significant religious mission, the legislation
attempted to guarantee that the aid would be restricted to secular purposes. State funding of religious instruction would be
constitutionally impermissible. The Court, however, deemed it
unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the primary effect
of the legislation would be to advance religion, since it concluded
that the "cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising un31. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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der the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement
between government and religion."3 3 In making the determination that the entanglement is excessive, there must be considered "the character and purposes of the institutions which are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority. '34 The Court applied these standards to the Roman
Catholic elementary schools in Rhode Island, since they had been
the only beneficiaries of that State's legislation. The Court noted
that the schools were controlled and managed by clerics and
were vehicles for the transmission of the Roman Catholic faith to
the next generation. The process of inculcating the faith is enhanced by the impressionable age of the students. The nature of
the aid furnished in Rhode Island was distinguished from the aid
furnished in Allen:
[T]eachers have a substantially different ideological character
than books. In terms of potential for involving some aspect of
faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not. We
cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control
and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the
purely secular aspects of pre-college education. The conflict
of functions inheres in the situation.3 5
About two-thirds of the teachers were nuns, but the Court saw
the same entanglement problems where lay teachers were concerned.
We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to
inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral .... With the best of intentions
such a teacher would find it hard to make a3 6total separation
between secular teaching and religious doctrine.
The Court concluded that the enforcement by the state of
the secularity of the instruction involved excessive entanglement
between government and religion.
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed ....

Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be

inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his
or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement be7
tween state and church.3
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
Id. at 615.
Id. at'617.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
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The Court also perceived impermissible entanglement in the
state's surveillance of expenditures for secular and religious education which was required under the statute.
The Court found the same impermissible church-state entanglement in the Pennsylvania legislation that it found in the
Rhode Island legislation. The Court also noted that the funds
were paid directly to the parochial school; in Everson the bus
fare reimbursement went to the parent, in Allen the books were
lent to the student, and in Rhode Island the supplement went directly to the teacher. The Court saw in this form of continuing
direct subsidy added dangers of government control and surveillance.
A different but significant form of entanglement was also
seen by the Court to follow from the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania legislation, namely, the divisive political potential of these
programs. The issue of the size of annual appropriations for
church schools would potentially divide the electorate along religious lines since most of the aid benefits one denomination.
Political division along religious lines was one of the evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect. The Court
also noted that governmental programs have an expanding propensity, and the likelihood of greater state involvement in and
contribution to church schools over time is indicated by the serious financial needs of such schools and the considerable political support for public aid. This was in contrast to the absence of
any substantial state involvement with religion resulting from
200 years of tax exemption for churches as discussed in Walz.
It is interesting that the church-state entanglement rationale and the "camel's nose in the tent" thinking should have been
so useful in the resolution of Lemon and ignored in Allen. Books
certainly can be subtle tools for sectarian indoctrination, and
certainly state surveillance of content would be a continuing effort as texts are revised and new books are ordered. The danger
of political division arising from state aid of this nature is substantial. And once the state buys books for the parochial school
student, surely the hard-pressed parochial schools will make additional requests of the legislature. Books, of course, constitute
a much smaller item of educational expense than teachers' salaries. A little bit of "secular" aid may be all right, but too much
"secular" aid is unconstitutional.3 8
38.

In Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213, cert. denied,

403 U.S. 955 (1971), it was held that Louisiana legislation authorizing the
expenditure of funds for salaries of teachers of secular subjects in pri-
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On the same day that the Supreme Court decided the Lemon
case, it also decided Tilton v. Riclhrdson39 which involved the
constitutionality under the religion clauses of the First Amendment of certain provisions of the Higher Education Facilities Act
of 1963 authorizing federal grants and loans to colleges and universities for the construction of a wide variety of facilities.40 The
act did not prohibit aid to church-related colleges and universities as such, but did exclude aid for "any facility used or to be
used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship,
or ... any facility which .. . is used or to be used primarily
in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity .... ',41 The United States retained, in
effect, a 20 year interest in any facility constructed with these
funds; if during the period any such facility were to be used for
any of the prohibited religious purposes, the government would
be entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its
value at such time which the federal grant bore to the original
cost of the facility. After the expiration of the 20 year period,
the restrictions on use would no longer be in effect.
Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut
received grants for five buildings: two library buildings, a
music, drama and arts building, a science building and a language laboratory. The action was brought in federal district
court by taxpayers against the officials who administered the act
and the four church-related colleges and universities. The three
judge court held that the act authorized grants to church-related
vate schools, including parochial schools, was violative of the Louisiana constitution. In Sanders v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn.
1970), affd mem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971), a three-judge court held that Connecticut legislation providing support for salaries of teachers of secular
subjects in private schools, including parochial schools, and providing
secular books for the schools, was violative of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed subsequent to Lemon. The supreme court of Maine has held that state subsidy of salaries of teachers
of secular subjects in parochial schools, and of secular books for such
schools, violates the state constitution and the First Amendment. Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 58 (Me. 1970). Similar proposed legislation
was held to violate the Massachusetts constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 258 N.E.2d 779 (Mass. 1970). The supreme court of Michigan held
that such legislation was not violative of the Michigan constitution or
the First Amendment. In re Legislature's Request for an Opinion, 384
Mich. 82, 180 N.W.2d 265 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 929 (1971).
The Michigan constitution has subsequently been changed. See In re
Proposal C, 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971).

39. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-21 (Supp. V, 1964).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 751(a) (2) (Supp. V, 1964).
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colleges and universities, and sustained the constitutionality of
the act under the religion clause of the First Amendment.' 2 The
United States Supreme Court held that the act authorized grants
to church-related institutions, and also held that the act did not
violate the First Amendment except with respect to the expiration of the 20 year limitation on religious use. Chief Justice
Burger issued an opinion in which Justices Harlan, Stewart and
Blackmun joined. Justice White issued a separate concurring
opinion. The other four justices dissented.
The establishment issue was analyzed in terms of the principles expressed in several previous cases: Does the act reflect a
secular legislative purpose? Is the primary effect of the act to
advance or inhibit religion? Does the administration of the act
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion?
The legislative purpose was expressed in the preamble to the act,
stating that it is important to assist colleges and universities to
accommodate the rapidly growing number of young people seeking higher education. This was summarily accepted as a legitimate secular purpose. On the question of whether the legislation
advanced religion, it was noted that bus transportation and textbooks for parochial school children and tax exemption for church
property assist religion and have been upheld as constitutional;
the crucial question is not whether benefit accrues but rather
whether the primary effect of the legislation is to advance religion. The grants to the Connecticut schools were for buildings
serving secular educational purposes. There was no evidence that
religious education seeped into the use of these secular educational facilities. The primary effect of the grants was not to advance religion, except with respect to the provision in the act that
after 20 years the facility could be used for religious purposes,
which was violative of the establishment clause since it could
have the effect of advancing religion.
Concerning the issue of excessive entanglement between
church and state resulting from this legislation, the Court discussed the differences in the educational purposes of the parochial elementary and secondary school and the church-related
institution of higher learning and the differences in the nature
of the aid in this case from the aid in the Lemon case. Religious
indoctrinaton is a significant function of the parochial school,
whereas it is not a substantial purpose of these four colleges and
universities although they are governed by Roman Catholic or42.

Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970).
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ganizations. There are non-Catholics on the faculty and in the
student body, and the academic atmosphere of these institutions
appeared to be intellectually free. Thus there is little likelihood
that religion will permeate secular education, and consequently
the need for governmental surveillance is limited and the danger
of excessive entanglement is reduced. The act subsidizes facilities dedicated to secular educational purposes, which require less
governmental surveillance to assure religious neutrality than
surveillance of teachers who are themselves not religiously neutral. In addition, the grants under the act occur only once, and
as a consequence there are no continuing financial relationships
and periodic analyses of expenditures as required under the
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania legislation. Inspection to insure
secular use was described as a minimal contact. It was also noted
that this legislation would appear to have less potential for political division on religious lines than the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania legislation in part because of the absence of intimate continuing relationships between government and the church-related
institutions of higher learning, and also because the problems of
elementary and secondary schools are local in nature, whereas
these Connecticut colleges and universities have a student constituency which is widely dispersed.
It should be noted that Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasized that the Court was deciding the establishment issue
only with respect to church-related institutions of higher learning with the primarily secular educational purposes of these Connecticut schools. The conclusion might well be different with respect to aid to church-related colleges whose educational purposes were more religious in nature. 43 It should also be noted
43. The New Jersey and South Carolina supreme courts have held
that the issuance of bonds by state educational authorities for the construction of buildings for private colleges, including church-related colleges, payable from college revenues and not obligations of the states as
such, is not violative of the state constitutions or the federal constitution. Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 267 A.2d 503 (1970); Hunt v. McNair, 255 S.C. 71, 177 S.E.2d 362 (1971). The United States Supreme
Court vacated these judgments and remanded in the light of the Lemon
and Tilton decisions. Clayton v. Kervick, 403 U.S. 945 (1971); Hunt v.
McNair, 403 U.S. 945 (1971). A similar state plan to assist the financing
of private institutions of higher learning, including church-related institutions, was held valid under the Florida constitution and the First
Amendment. Nohrr v. Brevard County, 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971). Similar legislation was held not to violate the Massachusetts constitution except with respect to institutions which train clergymen. Opinion of the
Justices, 236 N.E.2d 523 (Mass. 1968). A similar form of assistance was
held valid under the United States Constitution. Vermont Ed. Bldgs.
Financing Agency v. Mann, 127 Vt. 262, 247 A.2d 68 (1968), appeal dis-
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that under the federal act the aid went directly to the church-related institution. This was considered to be a factor militating
against the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania legislation in
Lemon. In upholding the book loan arrangement in the Allen case and the bus fare reimbursement in Everson, the Court
noted that the benefits passed directly to the parochial school
family and not to the school itself.
III.

HOW USEFUL ARE THE STANDARDS?

In the Lemon and Tilton cases, the Supreme Court clearly
enunciated the three criteria which were to be employed in the
determination of the constitutionality under the establishment
clause of public aid to church schools: (1) The statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; (2) the principal or primary effect
of the statute must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. If any of the three criteria is
not complied with, the legislation is unconstitutional as a law
"respecting the establishment of religion." rn the Allen case, the
Court did not employ the "entanglement" criterion, but rather
limited its rationale to the "purpose" and "effect" criteria. In
the Everson case, no explicit formula was employed, although
the reasoning was similar to that of the Allen case.
A.

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

It is, of course, accepted that legislative purpose is relevant
when a question of statutory construction is before a court. But
the history of the use of legislative purpose in the determination
of constitutionality is mixed. There is authority in Supreme
Court decisions both for and against the proposition that an unconstitutional legislative purpose is a sufficient ground for invalidiating legislation.44 For example, with respect to the taxing
and commerce powers of Congress, legislative purpose to regulate
"local" matters was at one time held to be constitutionally demissed, 396 U.S. 801 (1969). State grants to private colleges, including
church-related institutions, were held not violative of the New York or
United States Constitution. Canisius College v. Nyquist, 36 App. Div.
2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1971).
The constitutionality under the
First Amendment of state grants to church-related colleges has been
held to depend upon the sectarian nature of the institution. Horace
Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).

44.

See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-

tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose and
Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HAMy. L. REv. 1887 (1970).
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terminative, 45 but subsequently was held to be irrelevant. 0 In
a recent "speech" case,47 legislative purpose was held to be irrelevant, but in the area of racial discrimination it has been held to
be constitutionally determinative. 48 Now, under the religion
clauses it has been made relevant.
With respect to statutes providing public funds to church
schools, how does one determine whether the legislative purpose
is secular or religious? In the Allen, Lemon and Tilton cases, the
Court concluded that the legislatures and the Congress had a
secular purpose in mine in enacting the legislation because the
language of the statutes in each of the cases indicated that the
purpose was to enhance secular education although church
schools would benefit from the legislation. The Court dealt
briefly with the purpose issue in all these cases. It would seem
sufficient to satisfy this secular purpose requirement that the preamble state that a secular educational goal is what is in mind,
provided, of course, that the impact of the legislation is
reasonably related to a secular educational purpose. So it seems
that the "purpose" requirement is unlikely to be the basis of unconstitutionality except in the improbable situation of legislation
which aids religious educational objectives without any substantial secular education objective, in which case the legislation fails
also because it is violative of the "principal or primary effect"
standard. It seems most unlikely that violation of the "purpose"
standard would ever constitute an independent basis of unconstitutionality. There does not appear to be any purpose served
in discussing the difficulties of determining legislative purpose
by piecing together legislative debates and committee discussion
and drafting changes when the Court has evidenced a willingness
in the several cases which have been before it to accept at face
value the secular goals expressed in the legislation itself.

B. PRnCIPAL

OR

PRIMARY EFFECT

The Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of this standard
45. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
46.

United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); United States v.

Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506
(1937).
47. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
48. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339

(1960).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:159

in the Allen and Tilton cases, and in effect it did so in the Everson case, although the standard had not been expressly formulated in Everson. In Lemon the Court did not have to resolve the
"effect" issue because of its conclusion that the legislation was
violative of the establishment clause since it produced excessive
church-state entanglement. The only instance in which the
Court has determined that the principal or primary effect of
legislation assisting church-related education was to advance religion was in the Tilton case with respect to the expiration of the
20 year limitation upon secular use.
The common factors in the cases in which it was held that
the primary effect of the legislation was secular were (a) that the
legislative programs were for the benefit of educational institutions generally, whether state-supported or private, or the students attending such institutions, and (b) that the use of the
funds going to church-related schools or their students were restricted to secular purposes. The Court has made it clear that if
the public funds supported the religious aspects of education in
any substantial measure as well as the secular aspects of education in the church school, the "effect" standard would be violated. 49 In the Tilton case, the expiration of the limitation on
building use to secular purposes after 20 years was held to be
violative of the "effect" standard; the purely secular use for the
first 20 years of the building's life was not sufficient to satisfy
the requirement that the "principal or primary effect" of the legislation was not to advance religion. It is not quite as clear that
the program of secular aid must be one which is applicable generally to all schools, public and private, if benefit to the church
school is to be sustained. That is to say, it is conceivable that a
program of secular aid might be legislated for church schools
which was not considered necessary for public schools and private secular schools, and be deemed to be in compliance with the
"effect" standard. The fact remains, however, that in the opinions much has been made of the fact that the legislative programs were broadly applicable to both public and private education.
The requirement that the aid to the church school or its students be earmarked for secular purposes to satisfy the "effect"
standard involves rather questionable reasoning. The Court expressly recognizes that the church schools perform a secular and
religious educational function. Certainly the furnishing of se49.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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cular aid to church schools may free up funds for religious educational purposes which otherwise might be required to satisfy
secular educational needs. It appears, therefore, that religion is
likely to be advanced by secular educational aid. Conversely, if
the state were to provide funds to parochial schools for religious
education, funds may be freed up for secular education that otherwise might be required for religious education; it appears that
secular education is likely to be advanced by such religious educational aid. The point is that earmarking of the fund does not
necessarily determine its effect. In Everson and Allen, the Court
has obliquely recognized this point by stating that the furnishing
of bus fare or the furnishing of secular textbooks might make it
more likely that parents would send their children to parochial
schools. For the purpose of determining compliance with the
"effect" requirement it does not seem to make good sense to distinguish between secularly earmarked aid to parochial schools
and a general grant to such schools. The economic and educational results are likely to be substantially the same either way.
The weakness of the secular earmarking argument has been discussed in several minority opinions. 50
One should not lose sight of the fact that the "effect" standard speaks of the need for the "principle or primary effect" to be
secular; an incidental religious effect is permissible. It is submitted that the issue should not be how the statute categorizes
the funds furnished to the church school, but rather what the
principal or primary function of the church school is. If the
principal or primary social contribution of the church school is
the furnishing of an education to its students substantially comparable to the education which is afforded by the public school,
then it appears that the "effect" standard is satisfied regardless
of any categorization of the funds. It is obvious that the parochial schools came into existence so that the instruction of the
young would be related to the religious and philosophical positions of the church and to assure that the students remained in
the faith, but their principal or primary effect or achievement
may be secular, i.e., the training of the mind, the accumulation
51
of knowledge and the preparation for a career.
50. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Douglas); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625, 667 (1971)
(concurring opinion of Justice Douglas and dissenting opinion of Justice
White).
51. See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
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CHURCH-STATE ENTANGLEMENT

In the Lemon case, the Supreme Court held the statutes
unconstitutional because of the potential for excessive churchstate entanglement. In Tilton, however, the Court held that
whatever potential for entanglement existed under the statute
in issue was within constitutional limits. The entanglement
standard was not expressed by the Court in the Allen case, but
in the Lemon case the Court indicated that the legislation in Allen providing secular textbooks to church schools did not have
the same potential for entanglement as legislation providing for
the subsidization of teachers' salaries.
The relevant elements in the consideration of the entanglement issue are the surveillance of the educational and fiscal operations of the church school by the state authorities and the political divisions along religious lines as a consequence of the legislation. The Court has indicated that the surveillance required
to ensure that a building is used for secular educational purposes is less where a church-related college or university is involved than where a church-related elementary or secondary
school is involved, because of the greater likelihood at the elementary and secondary level of the injection of religion into
nominally secular subjects. It also appears from the discussion
in Lemon that the surveillance required to ensure that only secular books are furnished to church schools involves less entanglement than the surveillance required to see to it that the secular
teacher steers clear of religion. In Lemon the Court also noted
the entangling effect of the periodic financial audits required
under the legislation in issue and the potential for political division along religious lines as a consequence of annual appropriations to support church elementary and secondary schools, most
of which were maintained by one denomination. In Tilton, the
Court saw greater potential for political division in the support
of elementary and secondary schools than in the support of
church-related colleges and universities because of the peculiarly
local nature of the former as constrasted with the geographically
dispersed student constituency of the latter.
The distinction made by the Court between teachers and
books has a certain surface cogency. One never knows what a
teacher is going to say in the classroom, but one knows what the
book says and it doesn't change. Books which allude to divine
influence in science and in man's relationship with man do not
pose the problem. But what about books which speak favorably
of social or political positions with which the church is in sym-
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pathy, or which interpret the actions of the church in a favorable
light, or which deal with moral questions in a manner which is
favored by the church, or which suggest that order in the universe is the result of a plan? Are such books religious? Certainly
there is no prohibition upon a school textbook having a point of
view, and many church positions are supportable on secular
grounds. It should be remembered that Einstein expressed the
belief that the structure of the universe was not the product of
chance. 52 Presumably if a book repeatedly takes positions in line
with the thinking of the church, it may be concluded that the
book is not secular. The point is that the determination of what
is a secular book and what is not can be a very difficult and
subtle task of "surveillance," different indeed from checking on
'5 3
the teacher's secularism but nevertheless quite "entangling. "
It is the author's view that it is unsound to determine constitutionality on the basis of the relative difficulty of ensuring
that no religious content enters into the purposes for which the
funds are earmarked. As mentioned above, it is not realistic
to conclude that earmarking for the secular does not benefit the
religious. If the furnishing of secular aid frees up more funds for
religious educational purposes, then why worry about whether
the teacher cheats a little by bringing some religion into the
study of French? The basic question should be whether the
church school serves primarily a secular function in our society.

With respect to the issue of political division along religious lines
where aid to church schools is involved, there is no doubt that
such potential exists. It also exists where the church schools
are not aided by public funds; parents of parochial school chil-

dren who pay taxes and also pay for their children's parochial
education are frequently unsympathetic to school levies.

Abor-

tion and divorce laws also divide people politically along religious
lines, as do various international issues. Such divisions are not

good for the country. But the loss of diversity in education is
not good for our society.
D. BENEFIT TO CHILD OR PARENT
It is not clear whether payment to the church school student
or his family, as distinguished from payment directly to the
church school, has any bearing upon the constitutionality of pub52. A. ENSTEmN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS, 11, 40, 52 & 262 (1954).
53. For an empirical study of the actual operation of a New York
book loan program, see Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme Court and
the Establishment Clause, 79 YALE L. REv. 111 (1969).
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lic aid. The benefit went directly to the parent in Everson and to
the student in Allen, which facts were mentioned in the cases
in support of the conclusion of constitutionality. The benefit
flowed to the school directly in the Pennsylvania legislation
in Lemon, which was alluded to by the Court in support of
its conclusion of unconstitutionality. The benefit went directly
to the school in Tilton, which fact was not commented upon
in the opinion upholding the constitutionality of the federal
legislation. The benefit went to the teacher directly, as distinguished from the school, in the Rhode Island legislation in Lemon,
but there was no reference made to the relevance of this fact in
the opinion. The identity of the recipient of the public aid has
not been the ratio decidendi of any of the Supreme Court decisions in this area, but instead has been employed, if at all, as a
make-weight.
It is hard to understand why any payment of public funds
for church school purposes should be unconstitutional if paid di4
It
rectly to the school but constitutional if paid to the family.
would seem that legislative purpose and primary effect must be
analyzed in the same manner regardless of who the recipient is,
and the danger of political division resulting from the aid program would seem to be the same. It is arguable, however, that
the payment to the parent or child merely assists him in making
an educational choice to which he is constitutionally entitled.
But it seems that he would be similarly assisted by a payment in
that same amount made directly to the school.65
IV.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC AID
TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS?
What costs of elementary and secondary church school education can the state subsidize? Probably the costs of transpor54. The "child benefit" theory was criticized in the dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson and Rutledge in the Everson case. 330 U.S. 1,
24, 45, 55 (1947). See also Opinion of Justices, 259 N.E.2d 564 (Mass.
1970); Hartness v. Patterson, 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.E.2d 907 (1971) (tuition
reimbursements paid to church school students held violative of the
Massachusetts and South Carolina constitutions).

55.

Professor Paul Freund has commented that

the sharp dichotomy between pupil benefit and benefit to the

(parochial) school seems to me to be a chimerical constitutional
criterion. It is akin to the ineffectual effort in the mid-nine-

teenth century to classify such local measures as pilotage laws

as either regulations of safety or regulations of commerce, and
to make their validity turn on the classification. It was the
beginning of wisdom when the Court candidly recognized that
such measures were regulations of both safety and commerce.
Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1682
(1969).
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tation to and from school, school lunches, and other such expenses incurred by the family incidental to the educational process can be reimbursed. It appears that the use of secular books
can, be subsidized, at least if the subsidy is structured to run
from the state to the student or the family. It is not clear
that buildings can be subsidized even if the use is limited to
secular educational purposes; it appears that the subsidization
of a building that was to be used for both secular and religious
instruction would not be constitutionally permissible. It is clear
that public aid earmarked for salaries of teachers of secular subjects is impermissible. It also appears that direct grants to
the schools for operating expenses without any restrictions as
to the application of the funds would not be permissible. Grants
to the schools limited in amount to the expenses of secular education would not be permissible because they would involve the
same teacher and fiscal surveillance problems which invalidated the legislation in Lemon. 56 Teachers' salaries are the major expense of education; if funds earmarked for that purpose as
well as unrestricted grants and grants for "secular education"
are out, how can the schools be supported in any material way?
It may be that there is no way to subsidize the church elementary or secondary school in any substantial form. By its application of the "effect" and "entanglement" standards, the Supreme Court may have decided, in effect, that such schools can
receive only very limited funds for such purposes as transportation and secular books. The Court may have employed a
verbal formula to impose a quantitative limit upon parochial
school funding. In other words, a little aid is all right, but a lot
is unconstitutional.
It appears, however, that the so-called "shared time" arrangement may not be violative of the establishment clause under the reasoning of the recent decisions. In "shared time" situations, the parochial school students attend classes in the public
school conducted by public school teachers for part of the day, or
alternatively the public school teachers conduct certain classes
for parochial school students in the parochial school. In effect,
the parochial school student becomes a public school student for
a portion of his educational program. Assuming that the teachers
engaged in the shared time arrangement are bona fide members
56. For the suggestion that grants limited in amount to the cost of
the secular education provided by the parochial school would not violate the First Amendment, see Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid
to ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1968).
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of the public school faculty and teach public school subjects using public school teaching materials, a convincing argument can
be made that there is no breach of the establishment clause under
the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court. The legislative
purpose is clearly the secular one of providing secular education
to young people. Under the reasoning of Allen and Tilton, the
principal or primary effect is secular since the instruction is limited to secular subject matter. It also appears that the entanglement problem which was the stumbling block in Lemon is
avoided in the shared time arrangement. The teachers are employees of the public school system teaching public school
courses to students who are enrolled in a church school. There
would seem to be no more need for surveillance to ensure that
there is no religious instruction than there is in the case of the
instruction of students who are enrolled in the public school.
Also, there would be no entangling financial relationship because
there would be no payment or reimbursement made with public
funds to the church school; the teacher would be on the payroll
of the public school system and the instructional materials would
be furnished by the public school system or by the parochial
schools or by the students themselves. 57 The argument may be
made that the teacher is likely to be influenced to inject religious
elements into the secular instruction when instructing parochial
school students, particularly if the classes are held in the parochial school. But on the assumption that the teachers are bona
fide members of the public school faculty, such conduct would
constitute a breach of professional duty. There can be no absolute assurance even in the instruction of public school students
that religion will not be intertwined with the secular instruction.58 There is, of course, the constitutional obstacle in "shared
time" legislation that it has the potential for political division
along religious lines.
An educational voucher system has been suggested whereby
the state issues a voucher in a certain amount to the student, the
57. Certain forms of shared time have been held valid under the
Michigan constitution. In re Proposal C, 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9
(1971).

58. It should be noted that if the shared time principle is applied
to subjects with significant value content, the cultural distinctiveness of
the church school is lessened.
The use of state funds to pay salaries of public school teachers
working in parochial schools was held invalid under the Montana state

constitution. Chambers v. School Dist., 155 Mont. 422, 472 P.2d 1013
(1970). Similar legislation was held to be in violation of the Missouri
constitution.

Special Dist. for the Education & Training of Handicapped

Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966).
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student picks his school, and the state honors the voucher by paying the amount of the voucher to the public or private school, as
the case may be.5 9 There have been proposals for a tuition reimbursement plan whereby the state pays the parent for the private school tuition or a part of it, 60 or some form of tax deduction
or tax credit plan whereby the parent receives a credit or a deduction for the tuition expense, or a part of it, of the private
school. 61 The constitutional justification for these plans would
seem to be that neither the parochial school nor religion is being
aided or advanced, but rather that the child and his family are
being aided in obtaining the education which they are constitutionally entitled to elect. 62 The fact of benefit to the child or
the family was noted in Allen and Everson, and the direct payment to the school under the Pennsylvania legislation was
commented upon adversely in Lemon, but the recipient of the
funds has not been the ratio decidendi in any case. It is difficult
to understand why such schemes would be constitutional if a direct grant to the church school in the same amount would not be.
The financial significance is identical. The direct grant to the
school of a certain amount per pupil aids the family in its educational choice just as much as the indirect devices. Although the
Court has not ruled specifically on the constitutionality of the
unrestricted direct grant to the church school, the language and
reasoning of Everson, Allen, Tilton and Lemon strongly indicate
that it would be unconstitutional. The funds could be used for
religious educational purposes. The grant might have the primary effect of advancing religion. If policing teachers of secu59. For a description of the various proposed voucher systems see
L. REv. 466
(1971).
60. The supreme court of South Carolina has held tuition reimbursement grants to students attending colleges and universities, including church-related institutions, in violation of the South Carolina
constitution. Hartness v. Patterson, 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.E.2d 907 (1971).
The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts has held that tuition reimbursement grants to parochial school students would be in violation of
the Massachusetts constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 259 N.E.2d 564
(Mass. 1970). See also Swart v. South Burlington School Dist., 122 Vt.
177, 167 A.2d 514, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
61. The supreme court of New Hampshire has held special tax exemptions for parents of parochial school students in violation of the
New Hampshire constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258
A.2d 343 (1969).
62. A strong case can be made for treating a tuition grant to the
student as a benefit to him rather than to the church school where it
is in the nature of a reward for past military service or for outstanding
academic achievement. These situations seem very different from a
tuition grant generally available to all.
Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. Civ. MGHTS-CV. LI.
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lar subjects to ensure that they do not include some religion renders their salary supplement unconstitutional, then surely providing funds to pay teachers of secular or religious subjects without restriction cannot stand.
It is the writer's view that in making a judgment of constitutionality under the establishment clause, the Court should not
direct its inquiry to the expressed purposes for which the funds
are to be employed, but should look more broadly at the social
function performed by the parochial schools. There can be no
doubt that parochial schools were created so that the religious
and philosophical positions of the church would be an integral
part of the instruction. But it is submitted that the principal or
primary social function or achievement or effect of the parochial
school is the furnishing of education comparable to the education furnished by the public school system6 ' The parochial
school graduates go on to Harvard as well as Holy Cross, Michigan as well as Notre Dame. They become doctors, lawyers,
plumbers, bartenders, engineers, accountants, architects, teachers and businessmen, just like graduates of public schools. 4 Certainly the parochial school indoctrinates, but it is patently obvious that its principal accomplishment is the same as the principal accomplishment of the public school. It is often said
that the public school has the virtue of bringing together children of different faiths and races and economic levels. This certainly is true, but it is not contended that this "democratic" function is the principal social function or achievement of the public
school system. It is viewed as an important secondary function;
obviously the public school's principal function is the formal education it offers. Similarly the religious element in the education of the children in the parochial school is a secondary function. Since the parochial school children spend about the same
amount of time in school as the public school children, and since
they graduate about as well prepared as the public school students for college and careers, it is clear that the principal accomplishment of the parochial school is necessarily the same as
that of the public school.
It is the writer's view that the unrestricted grant to the
church school, whether paid directly to the school or indirectly by
funneling it through the parents or the students by way of educational vouchers, tuition reimbursement or tax credits should be
63.
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constitutional.

Using the standards employed by the Supreme

Court, the legislative purpose of such grants is secular because
the purpose is the subsidization of education which is comparable
to that obtained in the public school. One of the reasons offered
by the Supreme Court for the constitutionality of the real property tax exemption in the Walz case was that New York had
adopted the policy of encouraging charitable enterprises by exempting a variety of them from taxation, including churches;
hospitals, libraries, schools and churches serve the secular goal
of mental and moral improvement. The same reasoning is, of
course, available to rationalize the constitutionality of income, estate and gift tax exemptions and deductions for charities and
their donors, including churches and their donors. If a secular
rationale can be constructed for indirect subsidization of churches
as such, it is difficult to understand why there should be any
difficulty in finding a secular rationale for direct grants to
church schools.
The writer believes that to require that funds be restricted
to purely secular purposes in order to satisfy the "effect" test is
unsound. The primary effect of a secular grant is not necessarily
secular; the funds which the church school had previously allocated to the secular educational cost which is now being paid by
the state may be used for religious expenditures that otherwise
would not have been made. Conceivably there may be grants for
secular services which would not have been furnished at all by
the church school but for the grant; in such case, it can be said
that the restriction actually assures that state funds serve secular ends. But this would not be easy to establish, and arguably
the investigation of such factors would involve excessive entanglement of government and church. It is submitted that the direct or indirect uncategorized grant has an effect which is primarily secular because the primary achievement of the parochial
school is the furnishng of an education comparable to that provided by the public school. 65
65. Since parents are constitutionally entitled to send their children to parochial schools which meet state educational standards (Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ), arguably any prohibition
upon aid to parochial schools is an inhibition of religion and violative of
the establishment clause under the Allen, Lemon and Tilton decisions.
See Drinan, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 75 CASE AND COM., No. 2,
Mar.-April 1970, at 13. See Hughes v. Board of Ed., 174 S.E.2d 711 (W.
Va. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971), for a different rationale for
the same result. The Massachusetts supreme judicial court has held that
the state constitutional prohibition of aid to sectarian schools does not
violate the First Amendment. Opinion of the Justices, 259 N.E.2d 564
(Mass. 1970).
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The "excessive entanglement" obstacle with respect to the
direct or indirect grant must also be cleared. There is no surveillance issue since there is no requirement that the funds be
used only for secular purposes. The only entanglement issue is
the potential for political division along religious lines resulting
from the annual legislative appropriation for the church schools.
There are also similar divisions produced where state aid is denied parochial schools; the parents of the parochial students who
pay taxes and pay for parochial education are likely to be unfriendly toward school levies. And there is potential for division
along religious lines where legislation on divorce, abortion, liquor,
gambling, Israel and Communism are involved. A certain
amount of political division on religious lines or racial lines or
class lines is inevitable in a free and dynamic society. Certainly
the characterization of entanglement as excessive or constitutionally permissible is related to one's judgment concerning the
value of the legislation involved. It is submitted that the loss of
educational diversity would be more damaging to our society
than the religious division which follows from annual appropriations for church-related elementary and secondary schools. We
should also keep in mind that it is not only the danger of loss of
the parochial school that is involved, but also the secular private
school with limited sources of private support, due to the fact thaV
for political reasons the legislatures are not likely to give money
to the secular private school if the church school is denied funds.
If one accepts arguendo the constitutionality of the direct or
indirect grant, the question may be asked what the limit is, if
any, to the amount of public aid that may be granted to parochial
schools. If the state furnishes funds equal to the total budget of
the parochial school, then in view of the dual secular and religious nature of the education, it would appear that the state is
supporting more than the secular function. But it has been
pointed out that even where the funds are earmarked for secular
purposes, in all likelihood religious education is aided because
school funds that would otherwise have been spent for secular
purposes are made free for possible religious use. If public aid
is to be made available to church schools, there is realistically no
way to avoid aiding religious education. The question of the
quantity of aid should be left to the legislature once it is accepted
that the primary effect or achievement of the church school is
secular. 66
66. When church schools receive public funds, an issue arises as to
the extent to which the recipient becomes subject to the constitutional
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V. CONCLUSION
In its recent decision involving the constitutionality of Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania legislation providing support for parochial schools, the Supreme Court has cast serious doubt upon the
power of the state or federal government to aid such schools in
any substantial way. A strong argument can be made, however,
for the constitutionality of a "shared time" arrangement. Possibly the Court will uphold some form of voucher or tuition reimbursement system under a "child benefit" theory, or allow some
form of tax deduction or tax credit to the parents of church
school children, but it is difficult to understand why the Court
would uphold such indirect unrestricted subsidies when the direct unrestricted subsidy to the parochial school would be unconstitutional. It is suggested that the Court has failed to recognize
that the principal or primary effect or social contribution of the
church school is secular, i.e., the furnishing of education substantially comparable to that furnished in the public schools. If that
is so, then even under the standards established by the Court, unrestricted direct or indirect funding of church schools should be
permissible.
The educational options at the elementary and secondary
level are few. Unless the Court allows some form of substantial
public aid to the church school, much of the limited diversity that
presently exists may be lost. The secular private schools are
also indirectly involved in this controversy, since it is unlikely
funds will be made available to such schools which could not be
made available to the church school. If church schools, and other
private schools, are forced to close down in substantial numbers,
the resulting additional burden upon public school systems is
not likely to enhance the quality of the education offered by
them.
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